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ABSTRACT
Industrialization of the food and agricultural sectors changes the pattern of external effects.
Participants helped or harmed in the process attempt to influence outcomes through markets
and politics. Decisions about property rights and boundaries determine benefits and burdens
and the relative cost of animal agriculture in different jurisdictions. Prescriptions to redefine
property rights are influenced by selective perception of rights to share in the benefits and
be protected from costs. Political choices about the appropriate jurisdiction (state versus
local) for addressing environmental and nuisance effects of animal agriculture affect whose
preferences count and will influence the development of these sectors.
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The industrialization of the U.S. food and ag-
ricultural sectors is bringing about significant
change and giving rise to many concerns
among food system participants, rural citizens,
and public policy makers. In animal agricul-
ture, the concentration of animals on fewer,
larger farms and increased vertical integration,
contracting, and joint ventures are changing
the structure of farming and creating com-
munity and regional conflicts. Smaller farms
are losing their position relative to larger ones,
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and the locus of decisions is shifting from
farm to off-farm organizations. Larger animal
production units are increasingly leading to
conflicts between producers and neighbors,
and communities are faced with many actual
and potential environmental or nuisance
threats (Hallberg, Abdalla, and Thompson).
Some groups are concerned about the impact
of industrialization upon the conditions or
earnings of workers, while others are interest-
ed in social and community issues resulting
from changes in farm ownership and work-
force. Still other groups worry about the nu-
tritional value or safety of food supplied
through an industrialized system. At the same
time, many of these groups benefit as consum-
ers from the competition for profits potentially
available from reducing production costs that
drives the industrialization process.
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ganization with specialization in work and
trade including introduction of new technolo-
gy that advances the productive output of the
food and agricultural sectors. This process also
results in major changes in the pattern of ex-
ternal effects, creating benefits for some and
burdens for others. The changing interdepen-
dencies brought about by industrialization
cause many existing institutions to become in-
adequate or obsolete. New and innovative in-
stitutional arrangements are needed to articu-
late preferences and to coordinate economic
activities to better meet societal goals (Shaffer
1969).
Adjustment to industrialization is an evo-
lutionary process. Economists can assist by
promoting an understanding of the political
and economic forces at work and conducting
analyses of policy issues and choices. In this
paper, we discuss two important emerging is-
sues in animal agriculture. We first address
how policy prescriptions to redefine property
rights (broadly defined) are influenced by se-
lective perceptions about rights to share in the
benefits and to be protected from costs result-
ing from industrialization. Second, we high-
light the critical role that jurisdictional bound-
aries play in influencing the political
articulation of preferences about the external
effects of industrialized animal production.
Our focus in this discussion is upon the im-
plications of state versus local decision mak-
ing with regard to environmental and associ-
ated nuisance issues. Differences in states’
institutional rules affect whose preferences
count in making decisions about rights and
costs. Since decisions about property rights
and boundaries influence the degree to which
such costs are born by participants, they affect
the costs of doing business and the quality of
life in different states. These differences in
turn influence the development of animal ag-
riculture in the South as well as other regions
(Pagano and Abdalla; Abdalla, Lanyon, and
Hallberg). Finally, suggestions for improved
analysis of policy issues arising from an in-
creasingly industrialized food and agricultural
sector are offered.
An Evolutionary Framework
A simplified three-part framework is proposed
as being useful to analysis of food and agri-
cultural sector problems. Our interest is in the
interrelationships among institutions (informal
and formal rules or policies of the economy),
behavior (responses of different actors in the
parts of the economy of interest), and pe~or-
mance (the outcomes which people care
about). This is an evolutional y framework that
emphasizes how the system changes through
time and is dynamic in that it allows feedback
from one stage to another.
A central theme of economics and the ra-
tionale for capitalism is the concept of eco-
nomic transformation from less productive to
more productive systems. This transformation
is based upon advantages of specialization in
human activity and trade. It is driven by com-
petition leading to profits for the innovators
and lower cost producers, resulting in higher
average real incomes. Industrialization is the
organization of production to take advantage
of the increased productivity that results from
investing in capital goods. Scientific industri-
alization is based upon specialization in and
investments in knowledge to be used to in-
crease productivity. Differences in the capac-
ity to develop and use knowledge is a critical
factor explaining differences in productivity
among groups or countries. The industrializa-
tion of livestock production rests on recently
acquired and applied technical and organiza-
tional knowledge. But technical knowledge
absent a supporting system of institutions will
not produce the potentially available increases
in productivity and levels of living (Olson).
Economic performance follows from the
combination of technical possibilities and in-
stitutions. The increased productivity poten-
tially available from specialization and trade
is not possible without institutions to facilitate
preference articulation. Thus it is never a
question of politics versus markets for guiding
production to meet consumer and citizen
wants. In capitalism, the question becomes:
What are the rules for the market set by po-
litical means that will produce desired out-
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preferences for the kind of world we prefer.
Analytically, the political problem is to define
the rules for determining what is taken into
account as cost and, often the reciprocal, the
entitlement of participants.
This suggests framing the analysis in terms
of understanding changing patterns of costs
and entitlement that result from industrializa-
tion and predicting the consequences of in-
novations in rules that influence costs and en-
titlement. The environmental, nuisance, and
other impacts resulting from industrialization
of the livestock system can be viewed within
this frame. So, too, can predicting the conse-
quences of new rules, such as determining
whether industrialized swine production
would be profitable if all external costs were
imposed upon these enterprises. A question
central to the analysis is: What are the appro-
priate jurisdictional boundaries for determin-
ing the costs to be taken into account?
Selective Perception of Property Rights:
Defining Entitlement and Costs in a Political
Context
Property rights are taken as given by most
economists. In policy analysis, the practice is
to deal with a particular change in rights and
take other rights as given, or to ignore them
altogether. Based upon observations by Cease,
economists suggest that solutions to some ex-
ternality problems can be worked out through
bargaining to arrive at efficient outcomes, re-
gardless of which party has liability or own-
ership. This assumes that rights are clearly de-
fined, and thus tradable, and transactions costs
are not significant. There are a number of
problems with this argument, but the general
idea that defining rights and making them
tradable has useful applications. Of course,
transactions costs are seldom insignificant, and
the concept of efficiency is a narrow one—
essentially defined as allocating resources to
the highest bidder in a competitive market giv-
en a certain set of property rights. Note also
that property rights must be well defined. This
is clearly critical, as seen in the great adjust-
ment problems faced in countries attempting
to make the transition from planned to more
market-oriented economies. The distribution
of wealth (purchasing power), both before and
after the bargaining for the resource, is ig-
nored. This is important in evaluating eco-
nomic performance. Preexisting wealth deter-
mines whose preferences are articulated in the
highest bids. Ownership does matter in deter-
mining who becomes wealthy, and thus who
is able to articulate their preferences in the fu-
ture. Wealth and political power are highly
correlated. Clearly the issues cannot be framed
simply in the context of efficiency (Samuels).
Defining property rights involves determin-
ing what is counted as a cost and by what
means participants are entitled to a share of
the economic output. Entitlements are rights
to charge costs to the system or impose costs
on others. In a modern economy, there are
many rules that define rights and costs. They
have a pervasive influence on the performance
of an economy. Individuals and governments
selectively perceive the appropriateness of the
rules defining costs, and entitlement follows in
part from their limited capacity to comprehend
and analyze the complex patterns of rules de-
fining costs and to analyze the implications of
changing them. We would not choose to live
in societies with all of the rules defining costs
up for constant review, even if we could com-
prehend it, Selective perception in regard to
rights and costs is also a function of ideology
and the structure of power and capacity to in-
fluence perceptions. Technological develop-
ments and industrialization change the conse-
quences of existing rules of the economic
game, creating incentives to change the rules.
But perception about what is up for consid-
eration is always highly selective (Shaffer
1989). One of the roles of the economist
should be to expand the scope of inquiry.
Economists should frame the issues in a con-
text that opens a broader set of options for
improving performance than is perceived to be
relevant, given prevailing beliefs about the ac-
ceptability of the existing system of rights.
There are many problems in articulating
preferences for rights that determine costs be-
cause the implications of the policy defining
the rights are obscure and uncertain. To illus-
trate, start with the agreement that costs and60 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1997
benefits are associated with the industrializa-
tion of the U.S. livestock system and that they
will exist regardless of the rules defining their
accounting. Assume the benefits and costs of
the particular pattern of production and distri-
bution could be calculated. Benefits would in-
clude lower prices of meat, poultry, and dairy
products, and higher returns to some workers
and resource owners. On the cost side would
be suffering from loss of jobs, disruptions in
communities both in the new production areas
and those abandoned, and air and water pol-
lution. Assume the increased productivity and
lower output prices are made possible by a
number of technological and organizational
innovations and infrastructure investments
subsidized in part by taxes from several dif-
ferent jurisdictions. Further assume that ma-
nure from a large livestock facility is washed
into a river during a flood and ends up in the
Gulf of Mexico, and that this event is the “last
straw” leading to an additional bloom of the
red tide that precipitates suffering by the peo-
ple on the coast of Florida, losses to the tourist
trade, and the deaths of five asthmatic children
(because of added problems of breathing due
to the fumes of the red tide).
Consider some of these issues with regard
to defining the rights determining prices and
accounting for costs. Given current knowledge
and detection capabilities, tracing the conse-
quences of the water pollution would not be
possible. Even with information making the
link, the high transactions cost of a legal case
for damages would make such a case unlikely.
Important property rights in this case include
the rules for establishing the burden of proof,
the attribution of the damages from the last
straw compared with the total contributions to
pollution, and the rule that an actor cannot be
held accountable for damages which are an act
of God (the flood). If the case is taken out of
the courts and placed under the purview of a
rule-making agency, burdens of proof and the
benefit of the doubt rules will influence cost
and benefit outcomes.
Particularly interesting and important, but
seldom perceived as an issue, are the property
rights to the accumulated knowledge about the
food and agricultural sector that make the in-
creased productivity possible. Some of the
technologies used in animal production might
be patented. The rules on patented genetics
would create an entitlement and a potential
cost to the livestock production and marketing
system. If the case could be made that most
of the increased productivity in the livestock
system is attributable to accumulated knowl-
edge, a logical question becomes: Who owns
that knowledge? Suppose the polity decided
that half of the productivity increases were due
to accumulated knowledge and that the knowl-
edge belonged to the citizens collectively. The
owners, as is the case with other inputs, could
logically charge for the use of the knowledge.
If a “knowledge use fee” were applied in all
enterprises, the revenues might eliminate the
need for taxes and create a pool of resources
to compensate for damages resulting from in-
dustrialization of the animal sector.
The basic policy concept from welfare eco-
nomics is to continue to change the rules of
the game as long as someone is made better
off and no one is made worse off (Pareto op-
timality). Since this is nearly an empty box,
the concept was modified by some to include
the concept that rules would be modified as
long as everyone would be better off if the
winners could compensate the losers. In real-
ity, of course, it is not practical to identify
winners and losers and make the transfers con-
sistent with the goal of leaving all better off.
The above discussion suggests that there
are at least two different approaches to fram-
ing the issues associated with industrialization
of animal agriculture. One is to approach pol-
icy by focusing on defining specific property
rights, including ownership, based upon ethi-
cal or political judgments as to what is just. A
modification would be to define property
rights in a way that allows them to be mar-
keted where the resource has marketable char-
acteristics. This approach starts with the rules
and does not judge the outcome. The other
approach is to focus on the outcome, devising
rules to get the more desired outcomes. Here
a pro-growth policy would be mitigated with
compensation to losers. In both cases, selec-
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comes are on the agenda will shape the pro-
cess of preference articulation.
Current Policy Dilemmas over Siting Large
Livestock Facilities
Selective perception of rights and its impli-
cations for what are determined to be costs
and benefits are central to the many conflicts
arising from industrialization of animal pro-
duction. A generalized account of community
reactions to a modern large-scale swine pro-
duction facility is presented below. It illus-
trates the pattern of industrialization impacts
and how selective perception affects evalua-
tions of change and policy decisions.
A rural county with few land use regula-
tions has received a proposal for a permit from
a farm enterprise to construct and operate con-
fined swine production facilities to produce
4,000 hogs on six acres owned by a retired
farmer. The permit applicant has acquired the
needed state permits. The financial backing
and contractual agreements for inputs and
marketing the hogs have been obtained, and
now local approval is needed.
The retired farmer selling land to the new
operation, who will live adjacent to the facil-
ity, has stated that he believes the proposed
operation’s plans to manage manure will ade-
quately protect water supplies and minimize
odor and flies. Several local hog producers
with smaller yet modern operations also sup-
port permitting the new facility. Some other
farmers and businesses see the facility as an
input needed to sustain the area’s agricultural
base. Larger farms, agribusinesses, and lend-
ers see the new facility as a plus for the local
economy, believing it will result in local jobs
and increased input purchases.
Among the local farming community, con-
cerns are being voiced quietly about whether
farming at such a scale is a good thing for
their businesses and the county’s agriculture.
Smaller, less specialized farmers using more
traditional production practices have doubts
about the proposal since they believe they may
not be able to compete with the larger, more
efficient operations. Other producers are wor-
ried that possible waste management mistakes
by the large-scale farms will cause local sup-
port for agriculture, which they have worked
to build and sustain, to decline. Several influ-
ential leaders have publicly stated their sup-
port of the proposal. They perceive the facility
as an economic development opportunity for
the area, which has seen declining business
opportunities and job shortages.
All nonfarm neighbors within a mile of the
proposed facility are opposed to granting the
permit. Those adjacent to it are the most vocal
in their opposition, believing they will incur
losses from property devaluation due to odors.
One resident has brought information to the
hearing about the potential effects of pro-
longed exposure to manure odors on residents’
mental health, including depression. Several
residents are concerned about sicknesses that
may result from contamination of their drink-
ing water. One has obtained a study showing
that even state-of-the-art hog waste lagoons
leak and may contaminate nearby wells with
bacteria and nitrates. A second is troubled
about the potential of increased accidents from
local truck traffic. There is anxiety that con-
taminated water, odors, and flies may extend
over larger geographic areas, such as down-
stream of a watershed or into the local airshed
where odors may linger and concentrate under
some climatic conditions. Residents are con-
cerned that even though the applicant has ob-
tained the needed state water quality permits,
limited state staffing will not provide the en-
forcement needed to protect the count y‘s
streams and lakes, which are used for fishing
and other recreational activities. They also ar-
gue that no laws exist to protect them from
odors and flies.
As a result of these concerns, neighbors
and other interested county residents have
banded together and requested that local offi-
cials deny the permit. Also, due to the poten-
tial adverse effect of large-scale livestock fa-
cilities on public health and welfare, they have
requested that officials strengthen the county’s
land use and zoning ordinances. The county
officials are reluctant to do this since they be-
lieve that these facilities are exempted by state
law from such local laws because they are de-
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ties have blocked the siting of large swine fa-
cilities in this manner. The authority of one of
these county ordinances has been challenged
and has not yet been settled in court.
Technological and market forces are con-
ducive to hog expansion in this county, bring-
ing with it a new set of potential consequences
for market participants and the pattern of ex-
ternal effects. Whether a participant views the
development as good or bad depends on the
perspective from which these impacts are per-
ceived, The proposed enterprise, including
those linked financially or contractually to it,
and the retired farmer selling the land will re-
ceive the lion’s share of the benefits from per-
mit approval. These benefits can be viewed as
an entitlement, flowing from the institutions
and property rights. Additional economic ad-
vantages will be distributed to farm workers
and among the agribusiness sector inside and
outside the county. Consumers would also
likely benefit through lower pork prices, al-
though this is likely whether the permit is ap-
proved or not. The market appears to be work-
ing well for conveying preferences for some
attributes and some participants.
Many other participants face potential ad-
verse impacts or costs, either through the mar-
ket (declines in property values or losses for
exiting less efficient farmers) or by being bur-
dened with new costs (neighbors’ well testing)
or loss of benefits (reduced recreational ben-
efits from degraded water bodies). Since ex-
isting institutional rules do not require large
hog producers to consider many of these im-
pacts in their decisions, they are simply borne
by those unfortunate enough to be in the way
of the changes brought about by industrializa-
tion. From the standpoint of some participants,
it appears that the institutional mechanisms
(markets or politics) for expressing prefer-
ences for some attributes of food system per-
formance are either incomplete or inappropri-
ate.
Clearly, industrialization creates benefits or
entitlement for some groups and losses for
others. Simply because the impacts are derived
from new information and technologies and
market forces does not mean that the outcomes
are sacrosanct and socially correct. For in-
stance, if property rights to water resources
were held by the neighbors with private water
wells or those who fish in the county’s lakes
and streams, the hog producer’s costs would
be higher. With these costs internalized into
production, it is possible that hog farming
would not be competitive at this scale or lo-
cation. Moreover, property rights and our per-
ceptions of them define what we call benefits
and costs in debates about appropriate policy
responses to industrialization. The political ar-
ticulation of preferences will be greatly influ-
enced by what gets on the agenda based upon
perceptions about property rights, knowledge
and political influence of the participants, and
jurisdictional boundaries.
Jurisdictional Boundaries: Who Gets to
Make the Rules of the Economic Game?
The concept of boundary is relevant at several
levels in analyzing issues of preference artic-
ulation for food system attributes. Currently,
many external effects occur beyond the
boundary of the firms engaged in animal pro-
duction and are not considered by firm deci-
sion makers or reflected in market prices. For
political decisions, jurisdictional boundaries
define the group whose voice gets heard in the
process of specifying rights and granting en-
titlements. Ultimately, such political decisions
define what is counted in production of a com-
modity. Externalities are costs not charged to
the economic actor. Entitlements are rights to
charge for use of a resource or rights to share
in the output of an enterprise or community.
Entitlements for some become costs for others.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal
with all of the rules defining costs and entitle-
ments of relevance to the industrialized food
system. In the remainder of the paper, we fo-
cus primarily on the relationship of industri-
alization of the livestock system and rules for
use of natural resources, especially costs not
counted by firms (i.e., externalities).
The opportunity set of an individual or firm
is defined by the interaction of a complex set
of interrelated federal, state, and local institu-
tional rules. At the federal level, these rules
are broad, including basic rights and respon-Abdalla and Shaffer: Politics and Markets: Framing the Issues 63
sibilities from the Constitution and common
law that frame the scope of issues open for
decision at the state and local levels. This in-
stitutional context also includes specific laws,
such as the federal Clean Water Act, which
defines the rules for large confined animal
feeding operations. We address the issues as-
sociated with selection of boundaries for mak-
ing political decisions about the external im-
pacts of animal production. The focus is on
how the choice of state versus local institu-
tions affects whose preferences count and the
implications for performance. The conceptual
issues inherent in jurisdictional boundary se-
lection are discussed before turning to a re-
view of specific state decisions.
Criteria for Jurisdictional Boundary Choice
An individual’s ability to have public policies
enacted that are consistent with his or her pref-
erences depends on the tastes and beliefs of
fellow citizens. The definition of the decision-
making group depends on where the individ-
ual lives and how political boundaries are
drawn. Since jurisdictional boundaries have
received much attention (Tiebout; Breton;
Oakerson; Schmid; Bish; Oates; Vihanto),
only a selected overview of the criteria for se-
lection is presented here.
Responsiveness
Conventional wisdom suggests that local gov-
ernments are closer and are therefore more in
tune with local conditions and with citizen
preferences. Thus, it can provide an output
more likely to satisfy local citizens. This fol-
lows from the maxim that the government that
is best is the one that is closest to the people
(Breton). However, depending on how partic-
ular boundaries are drawn, one can be a mem-
ber of a majority or minority on a particular
issue (Schmid).
Homogeneity of Citizen Preferences
If people in an area have similar preferences,
larger jurisdictions that provide uniform out-
puts are possible. Conversely, if tastes differ,
the establishment of more, smaller jurisdic-
tions may allow preferences to be better sat-
isfied, Homogeneous governmental units may
form if people have the opportunity to move
(although not costlessly) to units having the
mix and level of public goods or services that
they desire most (Tiebout). A related school
of thought emphasizes the role of competition
among local jurisdictions in helping to reveal
preferences. The ability of citizens to exit dis-
ciplines governmental taxing, spending, and
rule making, and allows discovery of new in-
stitutional arrangements (Vihanto).
Interdependencies: External Effects and
Coordination Issues
The actions of governments, like individuals
and firms, are interdependent. This leads to ef-
fects that occur beyond a government’s bor-
ders and to related coordination issues. Such
effects prompt recommendations to redraw ju-
risdictional boundaries to encompass the spill-
overs so that these costs will be considered by
decision makers. Similarly, individual actions
by jurisdictions may contribute to overall re-
sults that are not in the interest of a larger
group of jurisdictions. One prescription is to
seek involvement of higher-level authorities to
coordinate actions, allowing the group to
avoid costs or capture benefits.
Economies of Scale
The existence of economies of scale in pro-
vision of certain goods or services suggests
larger jurisdictions that allow these advantages
to be realized. However, if the distinction be-
tween provision and production of services is
recognized (Oakerson), a government can re-
alize the benefits of producing goods with
scale economies, such as centralized waste
treatment, without actually having to produce
the service. They can act as governance struc-
tures to arrange for (i.e., determine need, fi-
nance, manage) without undertaking produc-
tion itself.Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1997 64
Uniformity and Stability
Uniformity or stability in the output of certain
goods or services of government may be de-
sired in order to promote economic activity or
to reduce uncertainty or costs. The lack of uni-
formity caused by excessive differences in
outputs of local units may increase costs for
firms whose activities span these boundaries.
Similarly, it may be argued that uniformity is
needed for equity reasons to create a “level
playing field” for competition among firms or
to assure that everyone receives a certain min-
imum level of a public good or service.
Favorable Political Rules (or Power and
Influence)
An individual or group’s ability to influence a
particular decision may be greater at one level
or another. This may be due to differences in
the ways that preferences are aggregated. Ex-
amples include differences in the specific rules
for representation of different interests, agenda
setting, and policy implementation. In some
cases, it may be advantageous for an interest
group to shift a decision to another level in
order to protect its position or create oppor-
tunities. Some have suggested that efforts to
raise responsibilities to the federal level are
actually efforts to limit the advantages of one
region or industry over another (Parshigian;
Libecap).
Problems of Preference Articulation: Free
Riders, Unwilling Riders, and Transactions
costs
If two people are going from here to there,
and two routes exist to get to there, and if each
person has a different preference for the route,
then a problem of preference articulation aris-
es. The two travelers can work out an agree-
ment and share the ride or, at twice the cost,
travel separately. Negotiation can possibly
lead to compensation of one to accept the oth-
er’s choice of route. But determination of the
compensation is a game theory problem. Now
consider the problems of markets and govern-
ments with many participants, Working out
compromises is expensive since transactions
costs are very high. There will be free riders
letting others pay the cost of working out so-
lutions and taking advantage of compensation
payoffs, even when none would have been re-
quired to gain participation. And there will be
unwilling riders unable to afford the transac-
tions costs to achieve desired compromise out-
comes.l
In political preference articulation, there
are high costs of information about alterna-
tives and consequences, and very high trans-
actions costs in working out compensating
compromises. Decisions may not be consistent
with preferences. Most citizens end up as free
and unwilling riders on a range of issues. The
big difference is between concentrated and
dispersed interests. In the intensive hog oper-
ation case, some participants-the firm own-
ing the facility, the retired farmer selling the
land, and adjacent neighbors—have the great-
est stake in the outcome. Many others may
care about the outcome for them, but the ben-
efits are small relative to the costs of becoming
informed and politically active. Once beyond
the scale of a town meeting, representative
government and interest group politics are
needed to work out compromises. A large
body of literature on rent seeking exists, which
generally takes a dim view of interest group
politics. But there is no practical alternative to
interest groups working out compromise so-
lutions to the definition of rights and defining
costs. Thus the rules for organizing, financing,
and exercising influence become critical in de-
termining the rules of the market and resource
use. This point becomes obvious in dealing
with intensive animal agriculture.
[The problem is similar for markets and politics,
but is moreobviousin political preference articulation.
For example, Henry Ford was able to deliver very low
cost cars—all black and identical. Competitors offered
variations. Because economies of scale and scope were
lost, prices for all cars increased. There was no feasible
means for car buyers to express a preference of the
low cost system with compensation to those who pre-
ferred a more expensive car but would have preferred
the cheaper car and a bonus. Transactions costs for
working out the compromise were too high. The mar-
ket is full of such examples.Abdalla and Shafier: Politics and Markets: Framing the Issues 65
Jurisdictional Boundary Issues and Their
Implications
In this section we selectively review recent
state and local policy changes for dealing with
the external impacts of animal agricultural
production. The implications for issues of
preference articulation and jurisdictional
boundaries of these developments are also pre-
sented.
Policy Responses to an Industrializing
Animal Agriculture
The current governmental units addressing ex-
ternalities from animal agriculture are mostly
at the state and local levels. As a result, there
are significant differences in environmental
regulations and ways costs are counted across
geographic areas. Permitting for large con-
fined animal feeding operations under the
Clean Water Act is an exception, but this pro-
gram’s implementation has been limited in
scope (Smith and Kuch). A trend of the 1990s
is to devolve authority to the states. Within
states, different criteria have been used by var-
ious interest groups to argue for the jurisdic-
tion to be given responsibility for decision
making.
Pennsylvania
Concern about water quality in the state and
in the Chesapeake Bay, as well as residents’
fears about nuisance odors from swine expan-
sion in some regions, motivated passage in
1993 of the Pennsylvania Nutrient Manage-
ment Act. The act requires all farms with more
than two animal units per acre to implement a
management plan certified by a nutrient man-
agement specialist. A key feature of the law is
the preemption of local laws affecting nutrient
management on farms. It prohibits local gov-
ernments from enacting ordinances concerning
animal nutrients that are stricter than those re-
quired by the Nutrient Management Act. Prior
to 1993, townships in south central Pennsyl-
vania were developing ordinances to address
problems from animal expansion. This local
preemption provision was sought by the state’s
major agricultural organizations because of
concerns about non-uniformity of ordinances
(the state has more than 2,500 municipal
units). The technical capacity of municipal
units to develop and enforce such laws was
another key argument for local preemption.
Regulations are expected to be finalized in ear-
ly 1997, and in place by the fall of 1997. Until
the law goes into effect, municipalities still re-
tain the authority to regulate animal nutrients,
but such activity has slowed substantially
since the law’s passage. However, the legality
of local preemption is likely to be challenged
and may need to be settled in the courts.
Iowa
In mid-1995, Iowa enacted the Animal Feed-
ing Operations Act, creating many new re-
quirements for poultry and livestock producers
and additional defenses against nuisance law-
suits. Important components of the law in-
clude: separation distances between buildings,
lagoons, and manure storage structures and
nearby residences; state construction permits
for certain facilities; an indemnity fund gen-
erated from permit fees; manure management
plans; habitual violator penalties; and manure
disposal requirements (Gault and Baumert).
The state’s natural resources agency developed
rules to implement the act that became effec-
tive in March 1996. The law has made nui-
sance suits more difficult by clearly placing
the burden of proof on those initiating such
suits, increasing the standard of evidence
needed to prove that a nuisance exists and was
caused by a facility, and making all legal costs
of suits the responsibility of the initiator if the
suit is found to be frivolous.
Recent decisions by administrative offices
and the courts in Iowa suggest that counties
have very little or no decision-making author-
ity over confined livestock operations. In
1996, the Iowa Attorney General responded to
a request from a county that wished to create
ordinances to regulate the location, construc-
tion, and waste disposal of swine facilities.
The office concluded that by enacting the An-
imal Feeding Operations Act, the legislature
had reserved the regulation of both large and66 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1997
small confined feeding operations to the state,
thereby precluding the possibility of local reg-
ulation (Benton).
County officials in Iowa attempted to reg-
ulate large swine facilities through their zon-
ing authority, but were thwarted recently by a
state Supreme Court decision to expand the
definition of a farm to include specialized pro-
duction facilities. The court contradicted an
earlier landmark case decision that left open
the possibility that “commercial” farms were
not subject to the agricultural exemption from
local zoning. In its 1996 decision, the court
concluded that a 2,000-head unit proposed on
five acres was an agricultural activity. This de-
cision broadened the definition of a farm to
include the rearing and management of live-
stock irrespective of feed supply or the ow-
ner’s other farming activities (Marbery, De-
cember 1996).
North Carolina
Counties are prevented from using zoning to
regulate large-scale swine facilities due a pro-
vision in their state law that exempted “bona
fide” farms, including large-scale livestock fa-
cilities, from county zoning (Copeland;
Heath). In response to a county’s enactment of
an ordinance that created a definition of such
a farm, a state law was enacted in 1991 to
specifically include livestock facilities within
the definition. This act came at the initiation
of the North Carolina Farm Bureau (Stith and
Warrick). The nation’s largest manure spill to
date—25 million gallons from a waste lagoon
at a large hog facility in eastern North Caro-
lina in June 1995—provided impetus for
strengthening the state’s regulatory programs.
A commission established by the legislature
after the spill produced a series of recommen-
dations that were adopted by the state legis-
lature in mid-1996. Important features of the
law addressing hog producers include: annual
inspections and operational reviews, creation
of a state general permit, and requirements for
owners of new or expanding farms to notify
nearby landowners (Dew). One general “non-
discharge” permit exists under which all reg-
ulated livestock operations must be registered
and approved (Feitshans).
In North Carolina, a state-level zoning pre-
emption has not stopped counties from at-
tempting to regulate hog farming. Five coun-
ties have used their powers under state statutes
allowing them to adopt stringent statutes to
protect public health (Buggs). The first major
test of the legality of local action of this type
may come in a suit by Carroll’s Foods against
a Robeson County ordinance (Marbery, No-
vember 1996).
South Carolina
In 1996, South Carolina passed one of the na-
tion’s toughest comprehensive hog waste dis-
posal laws. Under the new law, large produc-
ers must obtain permits and smaller ones
must comply with guidelines to be developed
by the state’s environmental and health agen-
cy. Important elements of the law include: set-
backs of manure lagoons from nearby prop-
erties and water bodies, standards for lagoons
and application rates of manure on farmland,
annual inspections of lagoons and monitoring
wells, and record keeping and training of fa-
cility operators. The law also has provisions
for odor control (Marber y, June 1996).
One interesting aspect of the development
of this bill is that it originated as an effort by
the major state agricultural organizations to
establish statewide uniform guidelines for an-
imal waste management and to preempt coun-
ties from enacting laws in this area. The effort
proved unsuccessful, however, as local gov-
ernments rallied to oppose limits on their au-
thority (McKenzie). Local officials’ concerns
about preempting their authority, in combina-
tion with an awareness on the part of other
interest groups of the environmental and nui-
sance impacts associated with the rapid
growth of large hog facilities in North Caro-
2The threshold contained in the legislation for di-
viding large and small farms was 420,000 pounds of
animal capacity (roughly 3,000 head of finishers, 1,100
sow farrowing units, and 300 sow farrow-to-finish op-
erations). Regulations to implement these thresholds
and other aspects of the law were being debated in
early 1997.Abdalla and Shaffer: Politics and Markets: Framing the Issues 67
lina, shifted the outcome away from the pre-
emption goal that was the bill’s original intent.
Kansas
Recent developments in Kansas illustrate how
concerns about corporate farming, environ-
mental quality, and nuisance issues interact
and how the outcomes depend on the jurisdic-
tional boundary chosen. In the early 1990s,
several counties wished to expand their animal
industries and felt they were constrained from
doing so by the state’s corporate farming law.
This law was amended in 1994, allowing
county commissioners to permit corporate
farming, provided they have the support of a
majority of registered voters via a referendum
(McEowen and Wadley 1994). Twenty-three
counties subsequently approved corporate
farming. Due to a complex of concerns related
to environmental, nuisance, and corporate
farming issues, several counties recently re-
versed their policies, creating much contro-
versy and uncertainty. Several large hog cor-
porations that had made significant invest-
ments in the state claim such reversals consti-
tute a “taking” (Marbery, March 1996). The
state’s attorney general has ruled that counties
have the legal authority to make such changes
in law in the public interest, based on the
“home rule” defense. However, the attorney
general’s office is not the final arbitrator
(McEowen and Wadley 1996). Legal uncer-
tainties remain to be settled in another juris-
dictional unit, the courts.
Perception of what is to be defined as a
taking varies among jurisdictions, with courts
making judgments imposing preferences about
rights on legislative jurisdictions. In this case,
changing the rules, and thereby creating a loss
in the value of an investment in a hog opera-
tion, could conceivably be judged in the future
as a taking requiring compensation, At the
same time, the loss of value in neighboring
land due to odor is less likely to be judged a
taking by a distant court than by local voters
who judge the odor and property value de-
clines to be an unacceptable cost. And it is
certain that the increase in land values result-
ing from a law allowing large hog operations
will not be taken from the benefiting land-
owner and given to those imposed upon by the
odor. As argued before, perception of rights is
highly selective.
Implications of Recent Developments
Several observations may be made about
whose interests appear to be served by insti-
tutions at different jurisdictional levels. These
themes are discussed along with supporting
evidence from states. The observations are
tentative and await verification in future re-
search.
The Bundling of Concerns and Where They
Get Expressed
As academics, we can talk about the “water
quality” issue or the “odor” issue. In the real
world, such distinctions are blurred. For areas
for which no rules exist to deal with new or
newly perceived consequences from industri-
alized animal agriculture, there are important
implications for preference articulation. In
many cases, nuisance issues, such as odor,
have no existing legal framework either to de-
fine them or to force them to be taken into
account. People concerned about them get
frustrated and attempt to register their prefer-
ences by whatever means are open to them
through interest group politics. This is often
accomplished by attaching one issue to anoth-
er issue that already is recognized as legiti-
mate, such as protecting water quality (Ham-
ilton; Abdalla and Kelsey). Interest group
politics and selective perception of rights may
result in preferences being worked out in un-
expected jurisdictions. In some instances, odor
may be the real local issue but the preferences
for protection from odor of livestock enter-
prises may be expressed by support for more
stringent state water quality rules. Recent de-
velopments in Kansas provide an example of
bundling of corporate farming concerns.
Organized Interest Groups Have Reasons to
Prefer State-Level Regulatory Authority over
Local
In three states reviewed here, organized agri-
cultural interests supported state involvement68 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1997
and preemption of local laws regulating ani-
mal agriculture. The problem with local reg-
ulations was the lack of uniformity or a “level
playing field” due to the potential for prolif-
eration of many local ordinances. When pro-
liferation of different laws occurs, the costs for
firms with activities that span across the local
jurisdictional boundaries increase. Given the
sizable investment needed for modern large-
scale animal facilities, the stability and pre-
dictability of regulations that affect costs are
critical to investors. State-level regulation is
more predictable than autonomous actions of
many local units. In addition, local govern-
ments, because they are unable to capture
economies of scale, may have less technical
capacity to develop or implement effective
regulations.
Agricultural and other interests may also
prefer state decision making because they are
able to more effectively influence legislation
and implementation of laws affecting animal
agriculture at the state level compared to the
local level. There is evidence that this oc-
curred in North Carolina (Stith and Warrick)
and Pennsylvania in the 1990s. This last ob-
servation is consistent with arguments made
by Libecap and by Parshigian regarding calls
for regulatory authority to be raised to a high-
er level (federal) by industries seeking protec-
tion from competition and other forces of
change.
The economics of political influence clear-
ly leads to a general preference for state-level
regulatory authority by organized interest
groups. Monitoring and lobbying at the state
level is much less expensive than providing
these services at hundreds of local govern-
mental units.
Food industry, agribusiness, and related
economic development groups are likely to
have a general preference for a statewide uni-
form approach to regulating animal agriculture
for the same reasons just discussed for orga-
nized agricultural interests. Uniformity and
predictability of regulatory costs are important
in promoting investments in large-scale animal
enterprises which are perceived to contribute
to the growth of regional and state economies.
The economic benefits of expansion of animal
production are likely to provide broad-based
benefits to a regional economy, whereas the
potential costs are more likely to fall on peo-
ple in the individual jurisdictions where facil-
ities are located.
In addition, state-level environmental
groups and the agencies they seek to influence
have reasons to favor state approaches that can
provide more control and predictability in
meeting statewide goals. They may wish to
“rationalize” the disparate efforts of local
governments and also be skeptical of the tech-
nical capabilities of local government repre-
sentatives and personnel.
Unorganized Residents Have Reasons for
Preferring Local Regulatory Authority
Nearby residents and others closest to the
problems of animal agriculture tend to want
rules from the level of government that is clos-
est to them, Such groups may believe that lo-
cal governments are more responsive to their
interests, more knowledgeable about local sit-
uations, or perhaps can act faster to address
problems. In the past, rural residents may have
been more similar in their attitudes about ag-
riculture, seeing it sometimes as a polluting
activity, but one that contributed to the rural
economy and provided open-space benefits.
However, large-scale animal agriculture is
changing these perceptions and attitudes.
Nearby residents affected by potential water
degradation, nuisance odors, and other issues,
have quite different perceptions of benefits
and costs from large-scale animal enterprises
than the general population. Consequently,
they often oppose them. In such efforts, they
are likely to feel that local governments are
more responsive to their interests than bureau-
crats located in offices far from their homes
and communities.
The Institutional Learning Process
The political economies of the different states
have become interdependent. Cross-state in-Abdalla and Shaffer: Politics and Markets: Framing the Issues 69
stitutional learning can take different forms.3
South Carolina, for example, learned from its
neighbor to the north and decided against local
preemption in passing strong environmental
rules for large hog enterprises in 1996. Only
three years earlier, there was little opposition
from local governments in Pennsylvania to a
nutrient management bill that contained a lo-
cal preemption provision. One difference be-
tween these two time periods is expanded pub-
lic awareness of environmental and nuisance
problems from large hog operations resulting
from major manure spills in 1995 in North
Carolina and the midwest (Smothers; Hen-
driks; Satchell). Also, a state moratorium on
hog expansions in Missouri in 1996 may have
affected the North Carolina legislature’s deci-
sions to enact tougher regulations than it
would have otherwise (Marbery, June 1996).
Interestingly, North Carolina, the fastest
growing swine production state, appears to be
moving toward allowing greater involvement
of neighbors and local officials in regulatory
decisions. In contrast, the institutional rules in
Iowa, a state with a dominant industry posi-
tion that has recently been challenged, has sig-
nificantly limited opportunities for local input
in such decisions. This may be due to a dif-
ferent balancing of the economic benefits and
environmental and nuisance costs for each
state depending upon its phase in the life cycle
of growth.
Final Comments
We have framed the issues related to the in-
dustrialization of animal agriculture as the
“working out” by participants of new rules of
the economic game in response to newly per-
ceived opportunities to profit from adopting
new technologies and organizations of pro-
duction. We have considered both the rules of
the game, which define what gets counted as
a cost by firms, and the rules defining the ju-
3The learning can go in a direction to weaken en-
vironmental regulations as well. For example, in an-
other economic and political climate, development in-
terests may lobby for regulations providing
competitive advantage, thereby leading to the “race to
the bottom.”
risdictional boundaries for rule-making au-
thority.
In the industrialization of animal agricul-
ture, one set of issues is best framed by the
following statement: The process of constant
transformation driven by opportunities for
profits produces winners and losers. Here the
issues have to do with protection of existing
values and rights to economic opportunities.
In the great transformation of the U.S. food
and agricultural system, many protective and
compensating policies were adopted. Farmers
are losing their status as a group that deserves
special protection. The issues in respect to the
transformation are in the same category as
corporate downsizing, superstore chains re-
placing local owners, and automation and in-
ternational competition replacing domestic
factory workers.
The transformation issues include: (a)
rights to compensation for losses resulting
from economic transformations or rights to re-
strict such changes to protect selected inter-
ests; (b) rights to share in benefits of transfor-
mations, including entitlements to compen-
sation for real and perceived contributions
(current, expected, and in the past); and (c)
rights to choose the kind of economy and
community we live in (size, fairness, conges-
tion, rate of change, etc.).
The second class of issues deals with ac-
cess to resources, especially shared resources
like air, water, and space. The basic issues in-
volve the rights to use or prohibit use of the
resources and the rights to compensation for
changes in access or values of these resources.
The two classes of issues come together when
communities compete for enterprises on the
basis of environmental regulations which in-
fluence the cost of doing business in different
locations.
Broadly framed, the issues go to the heart
of the role of governments in our society and
involve the expression of preferences about
the role of government at all levels. Neglected
in this discussion has been the importance of
implementation of the legislative rules of the
economic game. This takes us to the issue of
jurisdictional boundaries among implementing70 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1997
agencies. For example, is it an issue for a state
environmental or agricultural department?
There is no avoiding the issues. Without
directly addressing the changes, the system of
rights and costs that currently exist will reg-
ulate the market. If these rights are not spe-
cifically defined to deal with changes in the
economic opportunities, the market will work
out solutions; those who can capture the ben-
efits under existing rules will get them.
Preferences for the rules of the game are
seldom expressed directly by a specific vote.
Preferences are usually expressed by electing
representatives, perhaps based on party posi-
tions, and by participating in groups that have
political influence. Voting for representatives
is similar to choosing among restaurants with
nothing but “blue plate” specials. Articulation
of preferences via political influences is highly
biased in favor of the concentrated interests.
Political preference articulation is made very
difficult because of the high levels of uncer-
tainty of the relationship between a change in
a rule for the economic game and the perfor-
mance consequences.
So what are the implications of all this for
the roles of agricultural economists in dealing
with the emerging issues related to the chang-
ing organization of livestock production? Sev-
eral specific suggestions that would facilitate
more effective research and policy education
are detailed below:
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the likely level and distribution of benefits
and costs following from specific changes
or failure to make changes in the rules for
the livestock sector.
To contribute to a better understanding of
the institutional system that defines the
rules of the game for the livestock system
providing a context for policy.
To pay particular attention to the problems
of preference articulation for the dispersed
interests, reducing their costs of informa-
tion and participation.
To contribute to the process of working
out compromise solutions to emerging is-
sues and conflicts of interests. Perhaps the
most important contribution would be to
promote a fundamental understanding of
the democratic process and the roles of
government in articulating the rules of the
economic game for a democratic entrepre-
neurial market economy (which remains
an experiment to be proven sustainable).
References
Abdalla, C.W., and T.W. Kelsey. “Breaking the Im-
passe: Helping Communities Cope with Change
at the Rural-Urban Interface, ” J. Soil and Water
Conserv. 51(November/December 1996) :462–
66.
Abdalla, C.W., L.E, Lanyon, and M.C. Hallberg.
“What We Know About Historical Trends in
Firm Location Decisions and Regional Shifts:
Policy Issues for an Industrializing Animal Ag-
riculture Sector. ” Amer. J. Agr, Econ.
77,5(1995):1229–36.
Benton, T,D. Letter from Iowa Assistant Attorney
General to Andrew Van Der Maaten, Winne-
shiek County Attorney, 30 January 1996(7 pp.).
Bish, R.L. “Federalism: A Market Economics Per-
spective. ” In Public Choice and Constitutional
Economics, eds., J.D, Gwartney and R.E. Wag-
ner, pp. 35 1–68. Greenwich CT Jai Press, 1988.
Breton, A. The Economic Theory of Representative
Government. Chicago: Aldine, 1974.
Buggs, S. “Local Health Boards Make Own Farm
Rules.” Raleigh [North Carolina] News and Ob-
server, 2 May 1996.
Cease, R.H. “The Problem of Social Cost. ” J. Law
and Econ. 3(October 1960): 1–44.
Copeland, J.D. “Environmental Laws Affecting
North Carolina Livestock Producers. ” National
Center for Agricultural Law, University of Ar-
kansas, Fayetteville, 1994.
Dew, J. “Strict Hog Measures Get Final OK.” Ra-
leigh [North Carolina] News and Observer, 21
June 1996.
Feitshans, T. Agricultural law specialist, Dept. of
Agr. and Resour. Econ., North Carolina State
University. Personal communication, 17 Janu-
ary 1997.
Gault, C., and A. Baumert. “Iowa’s 1995 Animal
Feeding Operation Act (H.13 519).” Joint pub.
of the Public Policy Council/Iowa Farm Bureau
Federation and the Iowa Pork Producers Assoc.
Undated (19 pp.).
Hallberg, M. C., C.W. Abdalla, and F!B. Thompson.
“Performance in Animal Agriculture: A Frame-
work for Multi-Disciplinary Analysis. ” Discus.
Pap., Center for Biotechnology Policy andAbdallaand Shaffer: Politics and Markets: Framing thelssues
Ethics, Texas A&M University, September Animal
1996. October
Hamilton, N.D. “Trends in Environmental Regu- Parshigian,
71
Agriculture Task Force, Denver CO,
1994.
F?B, “Environmental Regulation:
Iation of Agriculture. ” In Increasing Under-
standing of Public Problems and Policies. Oak
Brook IL: Farm Foundation, January 1995.
Heath, M. S., Jr. <‘Intensive Livestock Operations in
North Carolina: Cases and Materials. ” In En-
vironmental and Conservation Law. Bull. No.
2, Institute of Government, University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill, March 1996.
Hendriks, M. “Manure Spills Threaten Water-
ways. ” Kansas City [Missouri] Star, 24 Sep-
tember 1995.
Libecap, G,D. “The New Institutional Economics
and Rural Development in the United States.”
Paper presented at the New Institutional Eco-
nomics and Growth Theory Workshop, Kansas
City KS, September 1996.
Marbery, S. “Hog Industry Insider.” Feedstu@.
Various 1996 issues.
McEowen, R., and J,B. Wadley. Kansas Agricul-
tural Law Update 1,1(November 1994): 3–4.
—. Kansas Agricultural Law Update
2,2( March 1996):3–4.
McKenzie, L. Governmental affairs specialist,
South Carolina Farm Bureau. Personal com-
munication, 16 September 1996.
Oakerson, R.J. “The Organization of Local Public
Economies. ” Rep. No. A-109, Advisory Com-
mission on Intergovernmental Relations
(ACIR), Washington DC, 1987.
Oates, W.E. Fiscal Federalism. New York: Har-
court Brace Jovanovich, 1990.
Olson, M., Jr. “Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk:
Why Some Nations are Rich and Others Poor. ”
J. Econ. Perspectives 10,2( Spring 1996):3–24.
Pagano, Al?, and C.W. Abdalla. “Clustering in An-
imal Agriculture: Economic Trends and Poli-
cy. ” In Balancing Animal Production and the
Environment. Proceedings of the Great Plains
Whose Self-Interests Are Being Protected?”
Econ. Inquiry 23(1985):55 1–84.
Samuels, W.J. Essays on the Economic Role of
Government, Vols. 1 and 2. New York: New
York University Press, 1992.
Satchell, M. “Hog Heaven—and Hell: Pig Farming
Has Gone High Tech, and That’s Creating New
Pollution Woes. ” U.S. News and World Report,
22 January 1996, pp. 55–59.
Schmid, A.A. Property, Power, and Public Choice.
New York: Praeger, 1987.
Shaffer, J.D. “On Institutional Obsolescence and
Innovation: Background for Professional Dia-
logue on Public Policy.” Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
5l(May 1969):245–67.
. “Selective Perceptions and the Politics of
Agricultural Policy Analysis. ” In The Political
Economy of U.S. Agriculture, cd., C.S. Kramer,
pp. 6 1–83. Washington DC: National Center for
Food and Agricultural Policy and Resources for
the Future, 1989.
Smith, K.R., and F?J. Kuch. “What We Know
About Opportunities for Intergovernmental In-
stitutional Innovation: Policy Issues for an In-
dustrializing Animal Agriculture Sector.” Amer.
J. Agr. Econ. 77,5(1995): 1244–49.
Smothers, R. “Waste Spill Brings Legislative Ac-
tion. ” The New York Times, 30 June 1995, p.
A-10.
Stith, I?, and J. Warrick. “For Murphy, Government
and Business Were a Good Mix. ” Raleigh
[North Carolina] News and Observer, 22 Feb-
ruary 1995.
Tiebout, C.M. “A Pure Theory of Local Expendi-
tures.” J. Polit. Econ. 64(October 1956) :416–
24.
Vihanto, M. “Competition Between Governments
as a Discovery Procedure. ” J. Institutional and
Theoretical Econ. 47(1992):41 1–36.